

Arms Control

Year	Pres.	House	Senate	Democrats	Republicans	
1900	R	R	R			
1904	R	R	R			
1908	R	R	R			
1912	R	D	R			
1916	D	D	D			
1920	D	R	R			
1924	R	R	R	We demand a strict and sweeping reduction of armaments by land and sea, so that there shall be no competitive military program or naval building. Until international agreements to this end have been made we advocate an army and navy adequate for our national safety.		
1928	R	R	R			
1932	R	R	R		Conscious that the limitation of armament will contribute to security against war, and that the financial burdens of military preparation have been shamefully increased throughout the world, the Administration under President Hoover has made steady efforts and marked progress in the direction of proportional reduction of arms by agreement with other nations.	Hoover supports armament limitations
1936	D	D	D			
1940	D	D	D			
1944	D	D	D			
1948	D	R	R	We advocate the effective international control of weapons of mass destruction, including the atomic bomb, and we approve continued and vigorous efforts within the United Nations to bring about the successful consummation of the proposals which our Government has advanced.		
1952	D	D	D			
1956	R	D	D	In this atomic age, war threatens the very survival of civilization. To eliminate the danger of atomic war, a universal, effective and enforced disarmament system must be the goal of responsible men and women everywhere. So long as we lack enforceable international control of weapons, we must maintain armed strength to avoid war.	We support this and his further offer of United States participation in an international fund for economic development financed from the savings brought by true disarmament. We approve his determined resistance to disarmament without effective inspection.	
1959	R	D	D			First arms control agreement between US and USSR
1960	R	D	D	A primary task is to develop responsible proposals that will help break the deadlock on arms control.		
1963	D	D	D			US, UK and USSR sign test ban treaty
1964	D	D	D	Through our policy of never negotiating from fear but never fearing to negotiate, we are slowly but surely approaching the point where effective international agreements providing for inspection and control can begin to lift the crushing burden of armaments off the backs of the people of the world.	It has permitted disarmament negotiations to proceed without adequate consideration of military judgment-a procedure which tends to bring about, in effect, a unilateral curtailment of American arms rendered the more dangerous by the Administration's discounting known Soviet advances in nuclear weaponry.	

Arms Control

1968 D	D	D	We will press for further arms control agreements, insisting on effective safeguards against violations.		
1972 R	D	D	The Democratic Party stands for keeping America strong; we reject the concept of unilateral reductions below levels needed for adequate military defense. But effective international arms control and disarmament do not threaten American security; they enhance it.	We believe in limiting arms—not unilaterally, but by mutual agreement and with adequate safeguards.	SALT I between US and USSR
1976 R	D	D	in the area of strategic arms limitation, the U.S. should accept only such agreements that would not overall limit the U.S. to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union.	Important steps have been taken to limit strategic nuclear arms. The Vladivostok Agreement of November 1974 placed a ceiling on the strategic forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Further negotiations in arms control are continuing. We shall not agree for the sake of agreement; on the contrary, we will make sure that any agreements yield fundamental benefits to our national security.	
1980 D	D	D	The Democratic Party wants an arms control process to continue, just as it wants to sustain strong policies against Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. We understand that both build peace and make our nation more secure. Accordingly, we must persist in a strong policy regarding the Soviet aggression, and we must seek ratification of SALT as soon as it is feasible.	First, before arms control negotiations may be undertaken, the security of the United States must be assured by the funding and deployment of strong military forces sufficient to deter conflict at any level or to prevail in battle should aggression occur . . . negotiations must be conducted on the basis of strict reciprocity of benefits—unilateral restraint by the U.S. has failed to bring reductions by the Soviet Union.	
1984 R	D	R	Ronald Reagan is the first American President in over twenty years who has not reached any significant arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, and he is the first in over fifty years who has not met face to face with Soviet leaders. The unjustified Soviet walkout from key nuclear talks does not excuse the arms control failures of the Administration.	Sharing the American people's realistic view of the Soviet Union, the Reagan Administration has pursued arms control agreements that would reduce the level of nuclear weaponry possessed by the superpowers. President Reagan has negotiated with flexibility, and always from a position of strength.	
1988 R	D	D	by testing the intentions of the new Soviet leaders about arms control, emigration, human rights and other issues, and by matching them not merely in rhetoric but in reciprocal initiatives and innovation, which takes advantage of what may be the greatest opportunity of our lifetime to establish a new, mutually beneficial relationship with the Soviet Union, in which we engage in joint efforts to combat environmental threats, explore peaceful uses of space and eradicate disease and poverty in the developing world, and in a mutual effort to transform the arms race that neither side can win into a contest for people's minds, a contest we know our side will win.	Arms reduction can be an important aspect of our national policy only when agreements enhance the security of the United States and its allies. This is the Reagan-Bush legacy; true arms reductions as a means to improve U.S. security, not just the perception of East-West detente. Clear objectives, steady purpose, and tough negotiating, backed up by the Republican defense program, produced the INF Treaty. This is the first real nuclear arms reduction treaty in history.	
1992 R	D	D	We must press for strong international limits on the dangerous and wasteful flow of conventional arms to troubled regions.	This means assuring stable command and control of the former Soviet arsenal, complete acceptance and verified implementation of all treaty obligations by the successor states to the USSR, and achieving the additional 50 percent reduction in strategic forces now agreed upon.	
1996 D	R	R	Four years ago, thousands of Russian nuclear weapons were aimed at American cities. Today, not a single Russian missile points at our children, and through the START treaties, we will cut American and Russian nuclear arsenals by two-thirds from their Cold War height.		

Arms Control

2000 R	R	R		Republicans believe that the administration should not negotiate inadequate modifications to the ABM Treaty that would leave us with a flawed agreement that ties the hands of the next president and prevents America from defending itself. . . In this context, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is another anachronism of obsolete strategic thinking. This treaty is not verifiable, not enforceable, and would not enable the United States to ensure the reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. It also does not deal with the real dangers of nuclear proliferation, which are rogue regimes — such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea — that seek to hide their dangerous weapons programs behind weak international treaties. We can fight the spread of nuclear weapons, but we cannot wish them away with unwise agreements.	
2004 R	R	R	We will lead an international coalition to put an end to the production of new materials – highly enriched uranium and plutonium – for use in nuclear weapons. And we will reduce excess stocks of existing nuclear materials and weapons. We will conduct a global cleanout initiative to remove stockpiles of vulnerable highly enriched uranium at research reactors and facilities in dozens of countries around the world within four years.	The President has strengthened this new relationship by concluding the historic Moscow Treaty on Strategic Reductions, which will reduce the nuclear arsenals of our two nations to their lowest levels in decades.	
2008 R	D	D	We will negotiate a verifiable global ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. We will work to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology so that countries cannot build—or come to the brink of building—a weapons program under the guise of developing peaceful nuclear power.	The gravest threat we face — nuclear terrorism — demands a comprehensive strategy for reducing the world's nuclear stockpiles and preventing proliferation. The U.S. should lead that effort by reducing the size of our nuclear arsenal to the lowest number consistent with our security requirements and working with other nuclear powers to do the same.	
2012 D	R	D	To reduce our warheads and stockpile, lower the threat of a nuclear exchange, and lay the foundation for future progress, President Obama negotiated and signed the landmark New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia, producing cuts in each side's deployed nuclear stockpiles and launchers and allowing us to monitor and verify Russia's arsenal.		
2016 D	R	R	Democrats want to reduce the number of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons around the world, as well as their means of delivery, while retaining a strong deterrent as long as others maintain nuclear strike capabilities. We will strengthen the NPT, push for the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and stop the spread of loose nuclear material.	We should abandon arms control treaties that benefit our adversaries without improving our national security. We must fund, develop, and deploy a multi-layered missile defense system. We must modernize nuclear weapons and their delivery platforms, end the policy of Mutually Assured Destruction, and rebuild relationships with our allies, who understand that as long as the U.S. nuclear arsenal is their shield, they do not need to engage in nuclear proliferation.	
2020 R	D	R	Just as was the case during the height of the Cold War, it's in our interest to work with Russia to verifiably limit and reduce our nuclear stockpiles. We will build on this foundation to negotiate arms control agreements that reflect the emergence of new players like China, capture new technologies, and move the world back from the nuclear precipice.		

Arms Control

2024 D	R	D	<p>The United States is developing and fielding only what is required to deter while signaling openness to future arms control negotiations if competitors are interested. The Administration is modernizing each leg of our nuclear triad, updating our command, control, and communication systems, and investing in our nuclear enterprise – to ensure that we can sustain and enhance if necessary capabilities and posture. President Biden has reaffirmed in U.S. doctrine that U.S. nuclear weapons are reserved for deterring strategic attack by those that threaten us and our allies and partners with nuclear weapons.</p>		
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